China eyes risks, gains as Trump pushes for ‘spheres of influence’ 

Hours before United States special forces abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro last Saturday, Maduro met with China’s special envoy to the Latin American country to reaffirm their nations’ “strategic relationship”.

Now the decades-long relationship is in question, as is the future of billions of dollars of Chinese investment in the country. At the same time, the US has handed China a new opportunity to assert its dominance in its own back yard, including on its claim to self-governing Taiwan, say analysts.

Under the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, recently revived by US President Donald Trump, the Western Hemisphere falls under the US sphere of influence – and the US only.

Trump invoked the doctrine in his latest national security strategy published late last year. Originally intended to keep Europe out of the Western Hemisphere, Trump’s version emphasises the need to counter China’s presence there.

The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine states the US wants a Western Hemisphere that “remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets, and that supports critical supply chains” in an oblique reference to China.

ABC News and CNN on Tuesday reported that the Trump administration was demanding that Venezuela cut ties with China, Iran, Russia and Cuba before it would be allowed to resume oil production.

The White House declined to confirm or deny the reports, which cited unnamed sources.

Trump has previously taken issue with Chinese investment in the region and claimed, incorrectly, during his inauguration speech last year that China was in control of the Panama Canal.

Since US forces captured Maduro last week, Trump has also revived claims that the US should “acquire” Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory, to protect US national security.

He claimed this week that the Arctic island was inundated with “Russian and Chinese ships,” although there is no evidence to support his claim.

“China is likely to read this as confirmation that the US is explicitly comfortable with hemispheric spheres of influence,” said Simona Grano, head of research on China-Taiwan relations at the University of Zurich’s Institute for Asian and Oriental Studies.

China immediately condemned Maduro’s abduction by US special forces as a “clear violation of international law” and urged Washington to “stop toppling the government of Venezuela”.

But the return of these spheres “cuts both ways for Beijing,” said Grano.

“On the one hand, it underscores the vulnerability of China’s investments and partnerships in Latin America; on the other, it may reinforce Chinese perceptions that Washington would find it harder to credibly oppose similar logic in East Asia, even if the Taiwan case is far more sensitive and escalatory,” she told Al Jazeera.

China has pledged to annex Taiwan by peace or by force if necessary and regards Taipei’s Democratic Progressive Party, which heads the democratically elected government, as separatists.

Diplomatically isolated Taiwan is only recognised by 11 countries and the Holy See, but it has unofficial backing from the US, which has pledged to help Taipei defend itself under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 Six Assurances.

While Beijing regards Taiwan as an “internal” matter, Trump’s policy regarding “spheres of influence” could offer it another way to discuss Taiwan on the world stage, said Lev Nachman, a political scientist and an assistant professor at National Taiwan University.

“I do think that America has created more global precedent for large powers to take action against other states beyond their jurisdiction,” Nachman told Al Jazeera.

Though China is unlikely to act militarily against Taiwan in the near future, “it will now have an easier time justifying military action if and when the day comes,” Nachman said.

Taiwan is not the only place Beijing may consider to fall under its “sphere of influence”. China claims much of the South China Sea and has ongoing territorial disputes there with Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Taipei, while it also claims the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

Disputes between China and India on its eastern border have ended in deadly clashes, including a 1962 border war and more recent skirmishes since 2020.

On Chinese social media platforms such as WeChat, Douyin and Weibo, Venezuela has been a major talking point over the past week, with some netizens drawing parallels to Taiwan.

“Since the US can illegally invade Venezuela and arrest its president, the [Chinese military] can legitimately and legally exercise its national sovereignty over unification,” one Weibo user wrote in a post that received more than 1,000 comments.

The White House has characterised Maduro’s abduction as a law enforcement operation, and its air strikes on the waters around Venezuela as a defensive move to stem the flow of drugs into the US. None of Venezuela’s neighbours has interceded, although they have condemned Trump’s actions.

While critics have rejected the Trump administration’s framing of the kidnapping as a law and order move, that approach, too, appears to have prompted suggestions from some on Chinese social media on how Beijing could try to take Taiwan.

“First, issue arrest warrants for pro-independence elements, then send people to search for them,” a Weibo user said.

“During this process, there will inevitably be people who obstruct us, so we will use the military to overcome the obstruction,” another Weibo user said. “This term is good: law enforcement action, which is more applicable to our internal province of Taiwan.”

Experts agreed that the Maduro abduction in Venezuela would not immediately change China’s plans for Taiwan, which Grano described as “categorically different from Latin America in terms of escalation and alliance dynamics”.

A conflict with Taiwan could quickly draw in the US and potentially its treaty ally Japan, whose Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said any attack or blockade of Taiwan would be a “survival-threatening situation for Japan,” potentially justifying the use of force. It could also dramatically affect global shipping routes through the strategically important Taiwan Strait.

Beijing has also not ruled out peaceful means of taking control of the democracy of 23 million people.

At the same time, “many [Chinese] netizens expressed shock at the United States’ unilateral handling of Maduro, with some commenting that the incident underscored a belief that only a strong country can avoid being bullied,” Jiang Jiang, chief editor of the China-focused newsletter Ginger River Review and a researcher at the Xinhua Institute think tank, told Al Jazeera.

Maduro’s arrest has shown Beijing that Trump is ready and willing to act on perceived threats, said William Yang, senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the Crisis Group.

Trump’s strike on Maduro was preceded by months of threats against the Venezuelan leader over his alleged ties to drug cartels, accompanied by US air strikes on alleged drug traffickers in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. The Trump administration has not released any evidence showing that the more than 100 people killed in these boat strikes were drug traffickers, or that the vessels were headed to the US.

“It’s a warning towards Beijing that the US will be willing to resort to the military option when trying to accomplish the goal of removing certain political forces in Latin America,” Yang told Al Jazeera.

Qinduo Xu, a Chinese political analyst who hosts a current affairs programme on the state-run CGTN television channel, agreed.

“It’s a reminder for China that the US is a different power – naked raw power – and they just throw out any kind of rules, international rules, or as long as they see the rules as in their way,” he told Al Jazeera.

Maduro’s ousting will likely reinforce Beijing’s preference for a model of engagement in Latin America where it does not assume any responsibility for the survival of its partnering governments and leaders, according to experts like Grano.

For the past 20 years, Venezuela has been one of Beijing’s closest partners in the region. China was the top destination for Venezuelan oil after the US imposed sanctions in 2019, and China has invested $4.8bn in Venezuela over that period, according to the Rhodium Group.

Beijing has also loaned the country tens of millions of dollars, of which JP Morgan estimates Venezuela still owes between $13bn and $15bn, according to a recent Reuters report.

The two sides signed an “all-weather strategic partnership” in 2023 – a diplomatic designation only granted by Beijing to five other countries. The partnership, however, does not include security guarantees, which means China will suffer little reputational damage in the long term as a trusted diplomatic partner for failing to come to Venezuela’s defence militarily, experts said.

Gabriel Wildau, the managing director of risk analysis company Teneo, told Al Jazeera he expected Chinese officials to remain pragmatic even as the US tries to assert its political sway over its “sphere of influence”.

“Ultimately … Beijing is likely to keep the bigger picture in mind. China’s leadership does not view relations with Venezuela as a core interest, and maintaining the current US-China detente is likely a higher priority,” he said. Trump is due to visit China in April amid negotiations aimed at resolving an ongoing trade war between the two superpowers that last year threatened to disrupt global commerce with spiralling tit-for-tat tariffs.

“Trump’s raid on Venezuela suggests that Chinese investments in Latin America now face greater political risks from US meddling in the region,” Gildau said. “Still, Beijing will likely respond by seeking ways to mitigate those risks rather than turning away from the region.”